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Abstract: Safety-critical systems are typically subject to assurance processes as way to ensure that they do not pose 
undue risks to people, property, or the environment, usually in compliance with assurance standards. The 
planning, execution, and management of assurance processes can be a complex activity in practice because 
of issues in the application of the standards, the large amount of information to handle, and the need for 
providing convincing justifications of assurance adequacy, among other difficulties. As a solution, many 
authors have argued that the use of Model-Driven Engineering principles and techniques can facilitate and 
improve assurance of safety-critical systems. This paper presents some of the latest advances that have been 
and are being made towards the use of these principles and techniques in industry. Although models have 
been used for assurance of safety-critical systems for many years, e.g. to specify safety cases, it has only 
been recently when the full potential of Model-Driven Engineering has started to be more widely exploited. 
This includes aspects such as the specification of metamodels and domain specific languages for assurance, 
the extension and application of UML, and the use of model transformations. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety-critical systems are those whose failure can 
harm people, property, or the environment, e.g. cars, 
trains, aircrafts, and medical devices. These systems 
are subject to rigorous assurance processes. 
Assurance can be defined as “the planned and 
systematic actions necessary to provide adequate 
confidence and evidence that a product or process 
satisfies given requirements” (RTCA, 2011); 
dependability requirements in general, safety ones in 
particular, and typically in compliance with 
assurance standards for certification.  
Examples of assurance standards include IEC 
61508 (IEC, 2011) for electrical, electronic, and 
programmable electronic systems in a wide range of 
industries, and more specific standards such as DO-
178C for avionics (RTCA, 2011), the CENELEC 
standards for railway (e.g. EN 50128 (CENELEC, 
2011)), and ISO 26262 for the automotive sector 
(ISO, 2011). Systems (and components) developers 
must follow the standards and enact assurance 
processes for safety-critical systems, and system 
evaluators (e.g. assessors, certification authorities, or 
regulators) must confirm the adequacy of the 
assurance activities executed by the developers. 
Assurance of safety-critical systems is a complex 
activity in practice. Standards are usually large 
textual documents that contain hundreds of pages 
and define thousands of compliance criteria. 
Ambiguity and inconsistency are common. System 
developers can easily face challenges because of 
difficulties in following and applying the standards, 
having to manage large amounts of assurance 
evidence, and having to provide valid justifications 
of system assurance and of the adequacy of the 
assurance activities, among other difficulties (de la 
Vara, 2016a; Nair, 2015a). These difficulties can 
lead to assurance risks (Alexander, et al., 2010), 
which are conditions that can make a safety-critical 
system developer incapable of (1) developing a 
system that complies with assurance standards and 
can be deemed safe, (2) adequately collecting and 
managing assurance evidence and thus guaranteeing 
system safety, or (3) making a third-party (e.g. an 
assessor) gain sufficient confidence in system safety. 
As a solution to the above issues, several authors 
have argued during the last decade that the use of 
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) principles and 
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 techniques can help practitioners to perform 
assurance activities, e.g. (Biggs, et al., 2016; de la 
Vara, et al., 2016c; Espinoza, et al., 2011; Falessi, et 
al., 2012; Panesar-Walawege, et al., 2013; Ruiz, et 
al., 2016; Wu, et al., 2015). Models, in conformance 
to metamodels (Bézivin, 2005), can used be e.g. to 
create representations of assurance standards and of 
how to follow them, to specify a reference of the 
assurance evidence to manage and of how to 
structure it, and to represent the justification of 
system assurance and of assurance adequacy, 
including the semi-automatic derivation of this 
justification with model transformations. 
Many of the possible usages of MDE for 
assurance of safety-critical systems have only been 
proposed in the literature, but some results are 
already starting to be transferred to practice through 
collaborative industry-academia projects, software 
tools, and international standards. In addition to 
providing support to assurance processes, MDE has 
also been used as the overall technology to develop 
tools to support the processes. 
This paper presents recent advances towards the 
industrial application of MDE for assurance of 
safety-critical systems. This information can be 
valuable (1) for practitioners (both system 
developers and evaluators) to gain awareness of how 
to exploit MDE for improvement of their assurance 
processes, (2) for tool vendors to find possible new 
features and new ways to develop software support 
to assurance processes, and (3) for academia to 
obtain an overall picture of recent research results on 
MDE-based assurance of safety-critical systems and 
to identify research opportunities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the main background of the paper, 
and Sections 3 to 7 describe specific efforts towards 
the industrial application of MDE for safety 
assurance. More specifically, Section 3 describes the 
OPENCOSS project, Section 4 the OpenCert 
platform, Section 5 initiatives and the OMG (Object 
Management Group), and Section 6 the AMASS 
project. Section 7 reports our main conclusions. 
2 BACKGROUND 
The background of the paper is divided into two 
broad areas: how models have been used for 
assurance of safety-critical systems in practice, and 
related work, i.e. other publications that have 
provided similar or related overviews about 
assurance process and practices. 
2.1 Use of Models for Assurance of 
Safety-Critical Systems in Practice 
The use of models, understood as graphical 
representations with a specific and constrained 
structure, in assurance activities for safety-critical 
systems is not an idea proposed during the last 
decade, but models have been used since long 
before. Practitioners have indeed reported the use of 
models to e.g. manage assurance evidence (de la 
Vara, 2016a; Nair, 2015a). In this section we focus 
on the arguably two main specific usages of models 
for safety-critical systems: the specification of safety 
cases and the representation of safety analyses. 
A safety case can be defined as “a clear, 
comprehensive and defensible argument that a 
system is acceptably safe to operate in a particular 
context” (Kelly, 1999). Safety cases are a 
specialization of assurance cases, which can be 
defined as “A collection of auditable claims, 
arguments, and evidence created to support the 
contention that a defined system/service will satisfy 
its assurance requirements” (OMG, 2017d). The 
notion of and the need for creating and maintaining 
safety cases is common in practically all the safety-
critical domains, in spite of being referred to with a 
different term, e.g. Software Accomplishment 
Summary for avionics software. 
Safety cases are usually provided as textual 
reports, but they can contain graphical 
representations. There exist two main graphical 
notations: CAE (Claims, Arguments and Evidence) 
(Adelard, 2017) and GSN (Goal Structuring 
Notation) (Goal Structuring Notation, 2017). Both 
support the modelling of the claims that assure 
system safety, the arguments that justify the claims, 
and the supporting evidence. GSN provides further 
concepts to represent e.g. the context of a claim, 
argument modules, and argument patterns. Figure 1 
shows an example of a GSN diagram. 
Regarding safety analyses, the application of 
classical techniques (Ericsson, 2015) is usually 
based on tables, but some are based on models. The 
most typical one arguably is FTA (Fault Tree 
Analysis). It is used to determine the root causes and 
probability of occurrence of a specified undesired 
event, and allows systems analysts to model the 
unique combinations of fault events that can cause 
an undesired event to occur (Ericsson, 2015). A fault 
tree is a model that logically represents the various 
combinations of possible events, both faulty and 
normal one, occurring in a system that lead to an 
undesired event or state (Ericsson, 2015). 
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 Figure 1: Example of GSN diagram (Goal Structuring Notation, 2017). 
Recent techniques for safety analysis are based 
on models too, e.g. STAMP (Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes) (Leveson, 2011). 
This technique has three basic underlying constructs: 
safety constraints, hierarchical safety control 
structures, and process models. 
2.2 Related Work 
Several publications have provided an overview of 
the safety assurance area and have provided insights 
into or referred to the application of MDE. 
The periodic seminal vision papers about the 
future of software engineering research published at 
the International Conference on Software 
Engineering are part of these publications. In a paper 
on challenges and directions for safety-critical 
systems, (Knight, 2002) states that “It is essential 
that comprehensive approaches to total system 
modelling are developed so that properties of entire 
systems can be analyzed. Such approaches must […] 
provide high fidelity models of critical software 
characteristics”. Five years later, (Heimdahl, 2007) 
reports that the “reliance on models and automated 
tools […] promises to increase productivity and 
reduce the very high costs associated with software 
development for critical systems”. Nonetheless, he 
also acknowledges that “The reliance on tools rather 
than people, however, introduces new and poorly 
understood sources of problems, such as the level of 
trust we can place in the results of our automation”. 
Heimdahl also reviews model-based development as 
an element of his vision for safety and software-
intensive systems. In the latest related publication of 
this paper series, on certifiably safe software-
dependent systems, (Hatcliff, et al., 2014) argue that: 
“The potential of domain modelling […] (now) is 
much more realizable by leveraging advancements 
in ontologies, modeling semantic networks, and 
knowledge representation combined with the use of 
stylized natural language”, and that “Open source 
projects should be pursued that provide […] 
modeling environments for building qualifiable 
tools”. Hatcliff et al. also review the potential of 
model-based system analysis and development. 
Regarding other publications, (Panesar-
Walawege, et al., 2011) present their experience, 
position, and vision on how to use MDE for safety 
evidence characterisation and management, mainly 
based on work in the maritime and energy sector. 
They worked with companies on the application of 
MDE to create common interpretations of standards, 
specialise standards to industrial contexts, align 
standards to organisational practices, plan 
certification, and manage evidence electronically. 
In our prior work (de la Vara, et al., 2016c), we 
reviewed approaches for model-based management 
of safety compliance and divided them into three 
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 categories: (1) approaches for safety regulation 
modelling, to model the content (i.e. text) of 
standards in order to perform some analysis for 
identification of issues such as conflicts and 
inconsistencies, e.g. (Sannier, Baudry, 2014); (2) 
approaches for safety standard-specific modelling, 
which correspond to those model-based approaches 
that focus on some safety standard, e.g. DO-178B 
(Zoughbi, et al., 2011) or IEC 61508 (Panesar-
Walawege, et al., 2013), and; (3) approaches for 
safety standard-independent modelling, which 
explicitly aim to support the specification of safety 
compliance needs in a generic way, so that they can 
be instantiated for any safety standard or domain, 
e.g. for process assurance (Gallina, et al., 2014)  and  
for evidence traceability (Nair, et al., 2014a). 
Finally, insights into the usage of models for 
assurance of safety-critical systems can be found in 
reviews of the literature (Nair, et al., 2014b) and in 
industrial surveys with practitioners (de la Vara, et 
al., 2016a; Nair, et al., 2015a), e.g. about the use of 
graphical argumentation notations. 
3 THE OPENCOSS PROJECT 
OPENCOSS (Open Platform for EvolutioNary 
Certification of Safety-critical Systems) (Espinoza, 
et al., 2011; OPENCOSS project, 2017) was a 
European research project on safety assurance and 
certification of embedded systems. The OPENCOSS 
consortium comprised four academic partners and 
13 companies, including safety-critical system 
manufacturers, component suppliers, certification 
authorities, safety assessors, and tool vendors. The 
project was supported by a large advisory board with 
representatives from more than 20 organisations. 
The project tackled the lack of precision and 
large variety of certification requirements, the lack 
of composable and system views for certification, 
the high and non-measured costs for 
(re)certification, and the lack of openness to 
innovation and new approaches. As solutions. 
OPENCOSS (a) devised a common certification 
framework that spans different vertical markets for 
railway, avionics, and automotive, and (b) developed 
an open-source safety certification infrastructure.  
The ultimate goal of the project was to bring 
about substantial reductions in recurring safety 
certification costs and, at the same time, reduce 
assurance risks through the introduction of more 
systematic safety assurance practices. The project 
dealt with (1) creation of a common certification 
conceptual framework, (2) compositional 
certification, (3) evolutionary chain of evidence, (4) 
transparent certification process, and (5) 
compliance-aware development process. 
Figure 2 shows the MDE approach for safety 
assurance and certification defined in OPENCOSS. 
It is based on several related metamodels targeted at 
different safety assurance and certification needs. 
The set of metamodels corresponds to the common 
certification conceptual framework. 
• The Reference Assurance Framework 
Metamodel supports the specification of the 
safety compliance needs that have or might have 
to be considered in an assurance project. Safety 
compliance needs can be from specific standards, 
recommended practices, or company-specific 
practices, and typically have to be tailored to 
project-specific characteristics. The latter is done 
by means of baselines.  
• Another source of information for safety 
compliance is the data about the product for 
which compliance is sought. The metamodels 
include the concepts and relationships necessary 
for modelling and managing project- and 
product-specific information.  
o The process executed to create a product 
(Process Metamodel). 
o The evidence of safety and of compliance 
(Evidence Metamodel). 
o The arguments that will be used to justify key 
safety-related decisions taken during the 
project (Argumentation Metamodel). 
 
Figure 2: Overall OPENCOSS MDE approach for safety 
assurance and certification. 
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 • The Vocabulary Metamodel is a means to define 
and record the terms and concepts used to 
characterize reusable assurance assets such as 
evidence, argumentation, and process data, as 
well as terms from standards. 
• With the Mappings Metamodel, maps can be 
created to specify the degree of equivalence 
between vocabulary terms (e.g. from different 
domains), the assurance information of a project 
(e.g. artefacts) and its baseline for indicating 
compliance, and safety standards (i.e. reference 
assurance frameworks). 
More details about the metamodels and the MDE 
approach can be found in (OPENCOSS project, 
2015c). The approach provides support to all the 
areas dealt with in OPENCOSS. For example, the 
MDE approach has enabled the systematic reuse of 
assurance information across systems and projects 
(Ruiz, et al., 2017), the semi-automatic generation of 
arguments (Ruiz, et al., 2015), the modelling of 
context-aware process families (Ayora, et al., 2016), 
and argument-based assessment of confidence in 
evidence (Nair, et al., 2015b). 
The approach was applied in three industrial case 
studies (OPENCOSS project, 2015a): an ePARK 
system for an electric vehicle in the automotive 
domain, the reuse of a railway execution platform in 
the avionics domain, and the certification of a 
signalling system in the railway domain. The 
application resulted in the determination of several 
improvements over the current practices for safety 
assurance and certification (OPENCOSS project, 
2015b), including a reduction of recurring costs for 
safety certification across systems, a reduction of 
recurring costs for safety certification across vertical 
markets, and a gain for product innovation and 
upgrading. Experiments in which people have used 
some parts of the OPENCOSS MDE approach have 
also been conducted to validate it (de la Vara, et al., 
2016b; de la Vara, et al., 2017c). 
4 OPENCERT 
The safety certification infrastructure for MDE-
based safety assurance and certification 
implemented in OPENCOSS (Ruiz, et al., 2015) has 
been further developed and maintained and has 
resulted in the OpenCert platform (OpenCert 
platform, 2017; Figure 3). OpenCert is an open-
source integrated and holistic solution for assurance 
and certification management of Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPS) spanning the largest safety and 
security-critical industrial markets, such as 
aerospace, space, railway, manufacturing, energy, 
and health. The ultimate aim of the platform is to 
lower certification costs in face of rapidly changing 
product features and market needs. 
 
Figure 3: OpenCert screenshot. 
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OpenCert is hosted and managed by the Eclipse 
Foundation through the PolarSys Working Group 
(PolarSys, 2017). This group corresponds to a 
collaboration of large end-user companies and open-
source tools providers dedicated to supplying 
industrial-grade open-source tools for the 
development of embedded systems. All the PolarSys 
solutions are based on technology and tools that 
have been deployed by large systems engineering 
and embedded systems development teams. 
The current features of OpenCert include the 
management of information from standards and 
regulations, the management of assurance projects, 
architecture-driven assurance, assurance case 
management, and compliance management. For 
architecture-driven assurance, OpenCert is linked 
with the Papyrus (Papyrus, 2017) and CHESS 
(PolarSys CHESS, 2017) Eclipse projects, and with 
the EPF project (Eclipse Process Framework Project, 
2017) for compliance management. 
In addition to supporting model-based CPS 
assurance and certification, the development of 
OpenCert itself exploits Eclipse-based MDE 
technologies such as EEF (Eclipse EEF, 2017), 
EuGENia (EuGENia, 2017) and GMF (Graphical 
Modeling Framework, 2017) for editor development, 
Epsilon (Epsilon, 2017) for model transformation, 
and CDO (CDO Model Repository, 2017) for data 
storage. 
5 OMG INITIATIVES 
We have presented above approaches, projects, and 
tools for MDE-based assurance of safety-critical 
systems that have resulted from arguably reduced-
scope initiatives, such as a consortium of 
organizations. However, the recent advances 
towards the industrial application of MDE for safety 
assurance go beyond these results. There are 
international, world-wide organizations and 
collaborations working on the topic. OMG (OMG, 
2017a) is among the main ones.  
OMG is a non-profit organization that develops 
open technical specifications and international 
standards for application of MDE in different 
domains, e.g. UML (OMG, 2017g) and SysML 
(OMG, 2017f) for software modelling and systems 
modelling, respectively. OMG members correspond 
to a consortium with international organizations of 
vendors, developers, end users, and researchers. The 
set of OMG specifications has also started to address 
system assurance aspects, and we review them in 
this section. Most of these specifications have been 
or are being developed in the scope of System 
Assurance Task Force (OMG, 2017e). 
SACM (Structured Assurance Case Metamodel) 
(OMG, 2017e) supports the representation of 
assurance cases in a structured and standard way. Its 
main sources have been CAE and GSN, and the 
main developers of these notations have contributed 
to the standard. SACM consists of a sub-metamodel 
for argumentation, one for evidence artefacts, and 
another for terminology. The metamodels aim to 
allow the interchange of structured arguments 
between diverse tools by different vendors. In a 
structured argument, the relationships between the 
asserted claims, and from the evidence to the claims 
are explicitly represented. The latest SACM version 
represents a considerable re-work and improvement 
to address certain limitations of previous versions 
(see e.g. (de la Vara, et al., 2017a)). 
DAF (Dependability Assurance Framework For 
Safety-Sensitive Consumer Devices) (OMG, 2017b) 
provides a system assurance methodology for the 
dependability argumentation for consumer devices. 
This is achieved by integrating conventional system 
assurance approaches, e.g. risk analysis and 
assessments, with a new way of approaching unique 
characteristics of consumer devices. The 
specification supports the objectives of device 
integration and includes the dependability case for 
argumentation, as well as new dependability 
development processes. The focus is to include the 
dependability argumentation particularly for 
consumer devices. To this end, a link with SACM is 
established. 
The most recent initiative is a request for 
proposals for a standard UML profile for safety and 
reliability (OMG, 2017c). The scope and content of 
this profile will be similar to some published in the 
latest years, e.g. (Biggs, et al., 2016; Wu, et al., 
2015), which are profiles that include concepts from 
safety standards so that they are explicitly and 
directly included in a system representation, e.g. 
created with SysML. This way, the system and the 
assurance information can be processed and 
analysed together. In addition, the request explicitly 
states that “proposals must consider how the safety 
information […] can be integrated into a SACM 
model as supporting evidence for an assurance case 
argument”, and that “Proposals shall discuss how the 
profile/model library can be used in conjunction 
with SACM, and how the proposed profile/model 
library’s argument notation compares with SACM 
and GSN”. This way, different OMG’s MDE means 
for assurance of safety-critical systems will be 
linked together. 
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 There is also some work ongoing for UML-based 
operational threat and risk modelling (OMG, 
2017h). This initiative aims to provide a conceptual 
model that unifies the semantics of and can provide 
a bridge across multiple threat and risk schemas and 
interfaces. The conceptual model will be informed 
by high-level concepts as defined by the cyber 
domain and other domains, but it will not be specific 
to any particular domain. 
Finally, the above specifications are recent and 
more work on their development and usage is 
expected in the future. This has been argued as 
necessary, e.g. for SACM (de la Vara, 2014). 
6 THE AMASS PROJECT 
The previous three sections have presented projects 
and initiatives from which stable, mature results 
exist. This section introduces an ongoing effort that 
is already providing new MDE-based support for 
assurance of safety-critical systems: the AMASS 
project (AMASS project, 2017a; Ruiz, et al., 2016). 
AMASS (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and 
Seamless Assurance and Certification of Cyber-
Physical Systems) is a very large-scale European 
research project. The consortium consists of 29 
partners; 21 from industry. The main issues 
addressed are the increase in CPS product 
complexity, the very high costs and effort for CPS 
assurance and certification, the lack of standardised 
and harmonised practices, the new assurance and 
certification risks, the need for dealing with 
architecture-specific aspects and with multiple 
dependability concerns, the wider variety of tools 
and stakeholders, and the insufficient reuse support.  
The project is developing an integrated and 
holistic approach and supporting tools for assurance 
and certification of CPS by creating and 
consolidating the first European-wide certification 
platform, ecosystem and community spanning the 
largest CPS vertical markets. The approach will be 
driven by architectural decisions, including multiple 
assurance concerns such as safety, security, 
availability, robustness and reliability. The main 
goal is to reduce time, cost and risks for assurance 
and (re)certification by adopting an evolutionary 
compositional certification and reuse approach. 
The AMASS approaches focus on the 
development and consolidation of an open and 
holistic framework that constitutes the evolution of 
the approaches from the OPENCOSS project and the 
SafeCer project (SafeCer project, 2017) towards an 
architecture-driven, multi-concern assurance, reuse-
oriented, and seamlessly interoperable tool platform. 
In more specific terms, AMASS has four main 
scientific and technical objectives, each addressing 
several sub-areas and all using MDE principles and 
techniques for the development of solutions for CPS 
assurance (Figure 4): 
 
Figure 4: AMASS work areas. 
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• Architecture-driven assurance, to adequately link 
system architecture specifications and assurance 
models. This includes system architecture 
modelling for assurance, management of 
assurance pattern libraries, assurance impact 
assessment based on verification and validation, 
and component contract-based assurance 
composition. 
• Multi-concern assurance, to deal not only with 
safety for CPS but also with assurance of further 
concerns, most notably security. Other relevant 
concerns are reliability and performance, among 
others. Multi-concern assurance requires system 
dependability co-analysis and co-assessment, 
dependability assurance modelling, and contract-
based multi-concern assurance. 
• Seamless interoperability, to ensure that 
assurance and engineering activities and the joint 
effort of the different assurance stakeholders are 
properly linked and supported. To this end, the 
sub-areas addressed are tool integration, 
collaborative work management, and tool quality 
characterisation and management. 
• Cross- and intra-domain assurance reuse, to 
make the reuse of CPS products across systems, 
standards, and domains more cost-effective. This 
will be possible thanks to new reuse assistance, 
semantic equivalence mapping of standards, and 
product, process, and assurance case lines. 
AMASS technology will be applied in 11 
industrial case studies from the automotive, railway, 
aerospace, space, and energy domains (AMASS 
project, 2016). Initial results from the application of 
the first project outcomes are available (AMASS 
project, 2017b), e.g. about modelling and co-
assessment of safety and security characteristics and 
about modelling of standards. Effort is also being 
spent to link the AMASS MDE approaches with 
other industrial practices for safety-critical systems 
engineering, e.g. the use of ontologies for system 
quality analysis (de la Vara, et al., 2017b). 
Last but not least, it is planned that the open-
source AMASS results are integrated, maintained, 
and further developed in OpenCert. 
7 CONCLUSION 
Assurance processes must be performed to provide 
confidence in the dependability of safety-critical 
systems. These processes can however be complex, 
and the application of Model-Driven Engineering 
(MDE) as supporting technology is advocated by 
many researchers and practitioners as a solution. 
We have reviewed recent advances that have 
been and are being made so that MDE becomes an 
industrial practice for the assurance of safety-critical 
systems. By using MDE principles and technologies 
such as metamodels and model transformation, 
complex and challenging assurance activities can be 
facilitated and improved, e.g. the specification of 
how to comply with a standard, the management of 
assurance evidence, the development of assurance 
cases, the specification of assurance processes, and 
the reuse of assurance information between projects. 
These benefits are a result of initiatives such as the 
OPENCOSS project, the OpenCert platform, OMG 
standards, and the AMASS project. 
We argue and envision that MDE will be a 
central technology in the future for system assurance 
in most organizations developing safety-critical 
systems. Many organizations are already using MDE 
principles and techniques although they might not be 
aware of it, e.g. when using models to represent 
assurance information or MDE-based tools such as 
OpenCert. This usage will be very likely extended in 
the future thanks to more mature MDE approaches 
for assurance that result in international standards. 
Finally, and based on our knowledge and 
experience, the full adoption of MDE for assurance 
of safety-critical systems needs to overcome some 
barriers. Challenges arising from practical aspects 
such as scalability, efficient model storage, and tool 
qualification must be tackled, at least for many 
open-source solutions. From a research perspective, 
the development of MDE solutions that cover a wide 
range of domains and of dependability concerns 
remains an area where further work is necessary. 
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